

Automation in computer-aided cryptography: proofs, attacks and designs

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CertiCrypt [3] and EasyCrypt [2] are machine-checked frameworks for proving the security of cryptographic constructions. Both frameworks adhere to the game-based approach [9, 6, 8] to provable security [7], but revisit its realization from a formal verification perspective. More specifically, CertiCrypt and EasyCrypt use a probabilistic programming language pWHILE for expressing cryptographic constructions, security properties, and computational assumptions, and a probabilistic relational Hoare logic pRHL for justifying reasonings in cryptographic proofs. While both tools coincide in their foundations, they differ in their underlying technologies: CertiCrypt is implemented as a set of libraries in the Coq proof assistant, whereas EasyCrypt uses a verification condition generator for pRHL in combination with off-the-shelf SMT solvers and automated theorem provers. Over the last six years, we have used both tools to verify prominent examples of public-key encryption schemes, modes of operation, signature schemes, hash function designs, zero-knowledge proofs. Recently, we have also used both tools to certify the output of a zero-knowledge compiler [1].

The next challenge is to extend EasyCrypt with automated mechanisms for discovering proofs or attacks. As a first step in this direction, we have developed a front-end that searches for security proofs or attacks for public-key encryption schemes built from one-way trapdoor permutations and random oracles. Given a candidate scheme, the front-end first searches for attacks using a deducibility relation inspired from symbolic cryptography: if an attack is found, it outputs an attacker. If not, the front-end searches for game-based proofs that the scheme is secure: if a proof is found, it outputs a concrete security bound and an EasyCrypt script that can be verified independently. We have evaluated the applicability of the front-end on more than hundred variants of OAEP [5], a widely used padding scheme commonly used for strengthening RSA encryption: pleasingly, it proves most secure variants of OAEP and computes security bounds that match known bounds in many cases. In addition, we have used the front-end in combination with synthesis algorithms to explore the design space of the class of encryption schemes it covers. This has led to the discovery of ZAEP [4], a simplified variant of the OAEP padding scheme that can be used to strengthen RSA encryption with exponents 2 and 3.

More information about the project can be found at:

<http://easycrypt.gforge.inria.fr>

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