

**‘Cause I’m strong enough:  
Reasoning about consistency  
choices in distributed systems**

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
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Birthday



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Data is replicated across multiple nodes



# Data centres across the world



**Disaster-tolerance, minimising latency**

# With thousands of machines inside



Load-balancing, fault-tolerance

# Replicas on mobile devices




Offline use



≈



- **Strong consistency model:** the system behaves as if it processes requests serially on a centralised database




≈



- **Strong consistency model:** the system behaves as if it processes requests serially on a centralised database
- Requires **synchronisation:** contact other replicas when processing a request






≈



- Increased latency
- Either strong **C**onsistency or **A**vailability in the presence of network **P**artitions [**CAP** theorem]




≈



- Increased latency
- Either ~~strong Consistency~~ or Availability in the presence of network Partitions [CAP theorem]
- Weak consistency models

# Eventually consistent databases



- **No synchronisation:** process an update locally, propagate effects to other replicas later
- **Weakens consistency:** deposit seen with a delay

# Integrity invariants

- *Account balance is non-negative*
- *Only registered students are enrolled into a course*
- *The winner of an auction is the highest bidder*

Eventual consistency often too weak to  
preserve invariants

# Integrity invariants

- *Account balance is non-negative*
- *Only registered students are enrolled into a course*
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Eventual consistency often too weak to  
preserve invariants

Invariant:  $\text{balance} \geq 0$



$\text{balance} = 100$



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$\text{balance} = 100$

`withdraw(100) : ✓`

$\text{balance} = 0$



$\text{balance} = 100$

`withdraw(100) : ✓`

$\text{balance} = 0$

# Invariant: $\text{balance} \geq 0$



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

balance = 0




balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

balance = 0

balance = -100





Invariant:  $balance \geq 0$



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

balance = 0




deposit(100)



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

balance = 0



balance = -100

# Consistency choices

- Choose consistency level for each operation:
  - ▶ Withdrawals strongly consistent
  - ▶ Deposits eventually consistent
- Databases:
  - ▶ Commercial: Amazon DynamoDB, Microsoft DocumentDB, Basho Riak
  - ▶ Research: Li<sup>+</sup> 2012, Terry<sup>+</sup> 2013, Balesgas<sup>+</sup> 2015
- Pay for stronger semantics with latency, possible unavailability and money

# Consistency choices

**Problem:** hard to figure out the minimum consistency sufficient to maintain correctness

**Contribution:** proof rule and tool for checking integrity invariants under given consistency choices

# Consistency model

- Generic model with consistency choices
- Not implemented, but can encode many existing models that are:
  - RedBlue consistency [Li<sup>+</sup> 2012],*
  - reservation locks [Balegas<sup>+</sup> 2015],*
  - parallel snapshot isolation [Sovran<sup>+</sup> 2011], ...*
- Declarative formal semantics in the paper

# Anomalies of eventual consistency



deposit(100)



notify(*done*)

# Anomalies of eventual consistency



deposit(100)





notify(*done*)




getNotif() : *done*



balance() : **0**



# Anomalies of eventual consistency



# Operation semantics



$\sigma$




$\llbracket op \rrbracket_{val}$

Replica states:  $\sigma \in \text{State}$

Return value:  $\llbracket op \rrbracket_{val} \in \text{State} \rightarrow \text{Value}$



# Operation semantics




Replica states:  $\sigma \in \text{State}$

Return value:  $\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{val}} \in \text{State} \rightarrow \text{Value}$

Effects:  $\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{eff}} \in \text{State} \rightarrow (\text{State} \rightarrow \text{State})$

# Operation semantics




Replica states:  $\sigma \in \text{State}$

Return value:  $[[op]]_{val} \in \text{State} \rightarrow \text{Value}$

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# Operation semantics




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


Replica states:  $\sigma \in \text{State}$

Return value:  $[[op]]_{val} \in \text{State} \rightarrow \text{Value}$

Effects:  $[[op]]_{eff} \in \text{State} \rightarrow (\text{State} \rightarrow \text{State})$

# Operation semantics




State =  $Z$

$$\llbracket \text{balance}() \rrbracket_{val}(\sigma) = \sigma$$


$$\llbracket \text{balance}() \rrbracket_{eff}(\sigma) = \lambda \sigma. \sigma$$

# Operation semantics




$$[[deposit(100)]]_{eff}(\sigma) = \lambda\sigma'. (\sigma' + 100)$$

# Operation semantics



$$[[deposit(100)]]_{eff}(\sigma) = \lambda\sigma'. (\sigma' + 100)$$

# Operation semantics



$$\llbracket \text{deposit}(100) \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma) = \lambda \sigma'. (\sigma' + 100)$$



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balance = 0

deposit(50)




balance = 0

deposit(100)


$$\llbracket \text{deposit}(100) \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma) = \lambda\sigma'. (\sigma + 100)$$



balance = 0



balance = 0




$$\llbracket \text{deposit}(100) \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma) = \lambda\sigma'. (\sigma + 100)$$



balance = 0



balance = 0



Replicas diverge!

# Ensuring convergence


- Effects of operations have to commute:

$\llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}} \in \text{State} \rightarrow (\text{State} \rightarrow \text{State})$

$\forall \text{op}_1, \text{op}_2, \sigma_1, \sigma_2. \llbracket \text{op}_1 \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma_1) ; \llbracket \text{op}_2 \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma_2) = \llbracket \text{op}_2 \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma_2) ; \llbracket \text{op}_1 \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma_1)$

- Replicated data types (CRDTs) [Shapiro<sup>+</sup> 2011]: ready-made commutative implementations


# Operation semantics



$\llbracket \text{withdraw}(100) \rrbracket_{eff}(\sigma) =$

if  $\sigma \geq 100$  then  $(\lambda \sigma'. \sigma' - 100)$  else  $(\lambda \sigma'. \sigma')$


# Operation semantics



$[[withdraw(100)]]_{eff}(\sigma) =$

if  $\sigma \geq 100$  then  $(\lambda\sigma'. \sigma' - 100)$  else  $(\lambda\sigma'. \sigma')$

# Operation semantics




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# Operation semantics



$\llbracket \text{withdraw}(100) \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma) =$

if  $\sigma \geq 100$  then  $(\lambda \sigma'. \sigma' - 100)$  else  $(\lambda \sigma'. \sigma')$



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

balance = 0

$\lambda\sigma'.\sigma' - 100$



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

balance = 0

$\llbracket \text{withdraw}(100) \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma) =$

if  $\sigma \geq 100$  then  $(\lambda\sigma'.\sigma' - 100)$  else  $(\lambda\sigma'.\sigma')$



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

balance = 0

$\lambda\sigma'.\sigma' - 100$



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

balance = 0

balance = -100

$\llbracket \text{withdraw}(100) \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma) =$

if  $\sigma \geq 100$  then  $(\lambda\sigma'.\sigma' - 100)$  else  $(\lambda\sigma'.\sigma')$

# Strengthening consistency

Token system  $\approx$  locks on steroids:

- Token =  $\{\tau_1, \tau_2, \dots\}$
- Symmetric **conflict relation**  $\bowtie \subseteq \text{Token} \times \text{Token}$

Examples:

- Mutual exclusion lock:  
Token =  $\{lock\}$ ;  $lock \bowtie lock$
- Readers-writer lock:  
Token =  $\{R, W\}$ ;  $\_ \bowtie W$ ;  $W \bowtie \_$

- Each operation acquires a set of tokens:


$$[[op]]_{tok} \in \text{State} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{Token})$$

- Operations acquiring conflicting tokens cannot be unaware of each other

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
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
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- Each operation acquires a set of tokens:

$$[[op]]_{tok} \in State \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Token)$$

- Operations acquiring conflicting tokens cannot be unaware of each other



- Requires synchronisation in implementations





balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

{lock}

*lock* ✕ *lock*



balance = 100



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

{lock}

*lock* ✕ *lock*



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ?

{lock}

Anything I don't know about?



balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

{lock}

*lock ✕ lock*



balance = 100




balance = 0



withdraw(100) : ?

{lock}





balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

{lock}

*lock ✗ lock*



balance = 100




balance = 0



withdraw(100) : ✗

{lock}





balance = 100

withdraw(100) : ✓

{lock}



deposit(100)

∅

lock ✗ lock



balance = 100

balance = 0

withdraw(100) : ✗

{lock}

Deposits proceed without synchronisation

Is the invariant preserved?



$\sigma \in \mathcal{I}$


op




Assume invariant holds



Check it's preserved after  
executing op



- Effect applied in a different state!
- Need to constrain possible  $\sigma'$  given  $\sigma$



- Effect applied in a different state!
- Need to constrain possible  $\sigma'$  given  $\sigma$
- **Rely-guarantee reasoning:** make assumptions about how states of other replicas can change



# Guarantee relations

Acquire a token  $\rightarrow$  acquire a permission to change states in a particular way

- $\forall \tau. G(\tau) \subseteq \text{State} \times \text{State}$ : changes allowed if acquiring  $\tau$
- $G_0 \subseteq \text{State} \times \text{State}$ : changes allowed always

# Guarantee relations


Acquire a token  $\rightarrow$  acquire a permission to change states in a particular way

- $\forall \tau. G(\tau) \subseteq \text{State} \times \text{State}$ : changes allowed if acquiring  $\tau$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

- $G_0 \subseteq \text{State} \times \text{State}$ : changes allowed always

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$




$\exists G, G_0. \forall op.$

$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in \mathcal{I} \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup G(([[op]]_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp))^*$

$\Rightarrow [[op]]_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in \mathcal{I} \wedge$

$(\sigma', [[op]]_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G([op]_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))$




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Need to find guarantees as part of the proof




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Check  $\mathcal{I}$  is preserved after applying  $op$ 's effect




$\exists G, G_0. \forall op.$

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$(\sigma', \llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G(\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))$

Guarantee that  $op$ 's effect conforms to  $G$  and  $G_0$




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$(\sigma', [[op]]_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G([op]_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))$

$op$ 's effect does state changes allowed always or ...



$\exists G, G_0. \forall op.$


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$\Rightarrow [[op]]_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in \mathcal{I} \wedge$

$(\sigma', [[op]]_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G([op]_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))$

...changes allowed by the tokens  $op$  acquires






$\exists G, G_0. \forall op.$

$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in \mathcal{I} \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup G(\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp)^*$

$\Rightarrow \llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in \mathcal{I} \wedge$

$(\sigma', \llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G(\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))$

Rely on  $\sigma$  and  $\sigma'$  correlated using  $G$  and  $G_0$




$\exists G, G_0. \forall op.$

$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in \mathcal{I} \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup G((\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp))^*$

$\Rightarrow \llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in \mathcal{I} \wedge$

$(\sigma', \llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G(\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))$

**Multiple operations may change state**




$\exists G, G_0. \forall op.$

$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in \mathcal{I} \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup G(\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp)^*$

$\Rightarrow \llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in \mathcal{I} \wedge$

$(\sigma', \llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G(\llbracket op \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))$

Concurrent operations make changes allowed always or..



$\exists G, G_0. \forall op.$

$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in \mathcal{I} \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup G(([[op]]_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp))^*$

$\Rightarrow [[op]]_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in \mathcal{I} \wedge$

$(\sigma', [[op]]_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G([op]_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))$

... changes allowed by guarantees for tokens that don't conflict with those of  $op$  as per  $\bowtie$

$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \forall \sigma, \sigma'. \quad & \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup G(\llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp)^* \\ & \Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I \wedge \\ & (\sigma', \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma')) \in G_0 \cup G(\llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma)) \end{aligned}$$

$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup G((\llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp))^* \\ \Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$

$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

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$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup G((\llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp))^*$$

$$\Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$

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$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in (G_0 \cup \overline{G((\llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp)})^* \Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$

*lock*  $\bowtie$  *lock*



$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$G_0^*$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in \overline{(G_0 \cup G(\llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{tok}}(\sigma))^\perp)}^*$$

$$\Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$

$\text{lock} \bowtie \text{lock}$

$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in G_0^*$$

$$\Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$

$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\sigma' \geq \sigma$$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in G_0^*$$

$$\Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$

Balance at a destination replica as high as  
balance at the origin replica

$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\sigma \geq 0$$

$$\sigma' \geq \sigma$$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in G_0^*$$

$$\Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$

$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\sigma \geq 0$$

$$\sigma' \geq \sigma$$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in G_0^*$$

$$\Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$

$$(\text{if } \sigma \geq 100 \text{ then } \sigma' - 100 \text{ else } \sigma') \geq 0$$

$$I = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \geq 0\}$$

$$G(\text{lock}) = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 < \sigma_1\}$$

$$G_0 = \{(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \mid \sigma_2 \geq \sigma_1\}$$

$$\text{op} = \text{withdraw}(100)$$

$$\sigma \geq 0$$

$$\sigma' \geq \sigma$$

$$\forall \sigma, \sigma'. \sigma \in I \wedge (\sigma, \sigma') \in G_0^*$$

$$\Rightarrow \llbracket \text{op} \rrbracket_{\text{eff}}(\sigma)(\sigma') \in I$$



$$(\text{if } \sigma \geq 100 \text{ then } \sigma' - 100 \text{ else } \sigma') \geq 0$$

If there was enough money at the origin replica,  
there will be enough money at a destination replica

# Soundness

- Proved soundness of the proof rule
- Nontrivial: depends on causal consistency and effect commutativity
- Soundness by compilation into an **event-based** proof rule: uses structures for specifying eventual consistency [POPL'14]

# Prototype tool

- Automates the proof rule
- Discharges verification conditions using SMT
- Case studies: fragments of several web applications



# Conclusion

- Lots of logics for shared-memory concurrency
  - ▶ Owicki-Gries [1976]
  - ▶ Rely-guarantee [Jones 1983, Pnueli 1985]
  - ▶ Concurrent separation logic [O'Hearn 2004]
  - ▶ RGSep/SAGL [Vafeiadis+ 2007, Feng+ 2007]
  - ▶ Concurrent abstract predicates [Dinsdale-Young+ 2010]
  - ▶ Higher-order CAP [Svendsen+ 2013]
  - ▶ CaReSL [Turon+ 2013]
  - ▶ Fine-grained concurrent separation logic [Nanevski+ 2014]
  - ▶ Iris [Jung+ 2015]
  - ▶ ...

# Conclusion

- Lots of logics for shared-memory concurrency
- Almost none for distributed systems

# Conclusion

- Lots of logics for shared-memory concurrency
- Almost none for distributed systems
- Clean, modular reasoning principles still applicable: rely-guarantee reasoning
- Starting point for research in distributed systems verification