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Inicio > Eventos > Charlas Invitadas > 2010 > Binary Program Analysis and Model Extraction for Security Applications
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Juan Caballero

martes 23 de marzo de 2010

11:00am IMDEA conference room

Juan Caballero, Researcher, Carnegie Mellon University, USA

Binary Program Analysis and Model Extraction for Security Applications

Abstract:

In this talk I present a platform to extract models of security-relevant functionality from program binaries, enabling multiple security applications such as active botnet infiltration, finding deviations between implementations of the same functionality, vulnerability signature generation, and finding content-sniffing cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. In this talk, I present two applications: active botnet infiltration and finding content-sniffing XSS attacks.

Botnets, large networks of infected computers under control of an attacker, are one of the dominant threats in the Internet, enabling fraudulent activities such as spamming, phishing, and distributed denial-of-service attacks. To build strong botnet defenses, defenders need information about the botnet’s capabilities and the attacker’s actions. One effective way to obtain that information is through active botnet infiltration, but such infiltration is challenging due to the encrypted and proprietary protocols that botnets use to communicate. In this talk, I describe techniques for reverse-engineering such protocols and present how we use this information to infiltrate a prevalent, previously not analyzed, spam botnet.

Cross-site scripting attacks are the most prevalent class of attacks nowadays. One subtle class of overlooked XSS attacks are content-sniffing XSS attacks. In this talk, I present model extraction techniques and how they enable finding content-sniffing XSS attacks. We use those models to find attacks against popular web sites and browsers such as Wikipedia when accessed using Internet Explorer 7. I describe our defenses for these attacks and how our proposals have been adopted by widely used browsers such as Google Chrome and IE8, as well as standardization groups.