Four papers by IMDEA Software Institute researchers have been accepted for publication at the 36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, a top-ranked conference in this important area, held in San Jose, CA. These four papers are among 55 papers selected for publication out of over 400 submissions to the conference.
IMDEA Software Institute faculty member Dario Fiore has a paper on privacy-preserving proofs, together with M. Backes (CISPA, Saarland University), M. Barbosa (HASLab – INESC TEC and Universidade do Minho), and R. M. Reischuk (ETH Zurich). Their work (whose title is “ADSNARK: Nearly Practical and Privacy-Preserving Proofs on Authenticated Data”) proposes a new system, called ADSNARK, that allows users to prove the correctness of computations while maintaining the privacy of the input data. The main novelty of ADSNARK is to work efficiently with authenticated inputs, a useful feature for applications such as smart metering and the emerging wearable computing paradigm.
Faculty member Juan Caballero and Ph.D. student Antonio Nappa have a paper on analyzing the lifecycle of software vulnerabilities in client applications (e.g., browsers, document editors). This work identifies several new threats presented by multiple installations of the same program and shared libraries. This work is collaboration with researchers at Symantec Research Labs and University of Maryland at College Park.
IMDEA Software Institute Ph.D student Antonio Nappa along with researchers from the International Computer Science Institute in Berkeley CA and other researchers from Google Inc. have a paper that presents a study on advertisement injection in browser session. They have developed a multi-staged pipeline that identifies ad injection in the wild and captures its distribution and revenue chains.
Faculty member Pierre-Yves Strub has a paper on designing a generic, robust and verified state machine for the TLS protocol with Benjamin Beurdouche (INRIA), Karthikeyan Bhargavan (INRIA), Antoine Delignat-Lavaud (INRIA), Cedric Fournet (Microsoft Research), Markulf Kohlweiss (Microsoft Research), Alfredo Pironti (INRIA), and Jean Karim Zinzindohoue (INRIA). Their work addresses the problem of designing a robust composite state machine that can correctly multiplex between these different protocol modes of TLS. They present the first verified implementation of a composite TLS state machine in C that can be embedded into OpenSSL and accounts for all its supported ciphersuites. They also discovered several critical security vulnerabilities that have lain hidden, for years, in popular open-source SSL libraries.
More information at SP 2015.
